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I. INTRODUCTION
The amendments to Federal Civil Procedure Rule 11 enacted in 1983,
concerning sanctions for frivolous litigation papers, prompted much
controversy and satellite litigation. By the latter 1980s many called for
further changes to the "stop and think" rule. Recent dialogue, aided by new
empirical research, culminated in amendments that took effect on December
1, 1993. In part, the 1993 rule reduces a party's incentives to pursue
sanctions because fewer types of misconduct are sanctionable. Additionally,
attorney's fees are available less often even when sanctions are warranted
because more public interest remedies like reprimands, fines, orders of
continuing education, and disciplinary referrals will be used. These changes
present not only new challenges, but also the prospect of new controversies.
This Article will focus on the increasing number of bar disciplinary
referrals likely to be prompted by the new rule. While the 1993 rule
1. The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 (underlined) and the deleted portions of the
earlier 1938 rule (lined through) are as follows. They appear with the final advisory
committee notes in the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165,
196-201 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Amendments].
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall
be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion,
or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by
rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in
equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony
of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is
abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief thera is geed gr..nd to .uppc. it; and that it iz n t i.terpad
fer-delay formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. ep-ij
signed with in~tent te defPAt the pucpeac of this fule; it maey be stieken ag shan aind
false an.d the aeti n may pr.....d as th .. gh the pleading had not bee. r.'ci. For a
wilfl viclatiefn ef this .dle an attamey may be subjeeted te apprepriate diseipliflapy
ati.. Similar a.i.. . may be take.. if . andelu er inde .nt mattr ig i.a..... If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay
to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. at 196-97.
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expressly invites more disciplinary referrals, it provides little guidance on
the procedural and substantive guidelines. The new rule is not even clear
on which recipient agencies are contemplated for the referrals, or when and
what forms of "vigilante" discipline would be appropriate as alternatives, or
supplements, to these referrals. Further, many state disciplinary agencies are
ill prepared to handle a flood of Rule 11 referrals. This Article will address
these issues, as well as offer suggestions on the relationship between
disciplinary referrals and other available sanctions under the new Rule 11.
II. THE RECENT HISTORY OF RULE 11: FEWER FEE AWARDS
AND MORE DISCIPLINARY REFERRALS
A. Changes in Sanctionable Conduct and Sanctioning Authority
Under Rule 11 in the 1980s and 1990s
Pursuant to the August 1983 amendments to Federal Civil Rule 11, the
signature of an attorney on a court paper constituted a certification by the
attorney that "to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry" the paper was "well grounded in fact."'  If an
attorney violated this standard, the trial court was required to impose "an
appropriate sanction," which was most often imposed on an attorney,3 and
frequently required the payment of money to defray the opposing party's
legal expenses, including attorney's fees. The 1983 amendments were
intended to discourage frivolous filings by lawyers in order to "streamline
the litigation process."4  Although the 1983 rule required attorneys to
certify that papers were "well grounded in fact," the previous rule, which
became effective in 1938, required only certifications as to "good ground."5
The 1983 rule also expressly required attorneys to undertake "some prefiling
inquiry into both the facts and the law," 6 but the 1938 rule contained no
such explicit requirement.7 The 1983 amendments were thus intended to
2. Id. at 196.
3. Id. at 197; see also id. at 200 (advisory committee note). Although the rule
provided that a violation of the signature requirement may have resulted in sanctions against
"the person who signed it, a represented party, or both," id. at 197, the federal courts were
not disposed toward sanctioning a client for misconduct solely the responsibility of his
attorney. See, e.g., Cine Forty-Second St. Theater Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602
F.2d 1062, 1069 (2d Cir. 1979) (Oakes, J., concurring) ("It would be with the greatest
reluctance, however, that I would visit upon the client the sins of counsel, absent client's
knowledge, condonation, compliance, or causation.").
4. 1983 Amendments, supra note 1, at 198 (advisory committee note).
5. Id. at 197.
6. Id. at 198 (advisory committee note).
7. Id. at 197. Though the phrase "formed after reasonable inquiry" was added in
1983, a few cases read a duty of inquiry into the former rule. See United States v. Price, 577
F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (D.N.J. 1983); Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365
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make the certification standard for attorneys "more stringent" and to create
an expectation that "a greater range of circumstances [would] trigger"
violations of the signature rule.8
The 1983 amendments were intended to increase court responsibility for
frivolous papers. The 1983 rule required that judges "shall impose"
sanctions for violations of the signature requirement, whereas the 1938 rule
provided only that attorneys "may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action. ' Additionally, the 1983 rule required sanctions for intentional and
unintentional violations, but the 1938 rule permitted disciplinary action only
for "wilful" violations.' ° The 1983 amendments were said to stress "a
deterrent orientation in dealing with improper .. . papers' " and were
intended to "focus the court's attention on the need to impose sanctions."' 2
The only "appropriate sanction" expressly mentioned in the 1983 rule was
"an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing . . . , including a reasonable
attorney's fee."' 3 The 1938 rule failed to elaborate on or illustrate what
might constitute "appropriate disciplinary action."
The 1983 amendments produced so much literature and litigation that
in 1990 some federal rule-makers issued a Call for Written Comments14 on
the recent Rule 11 experience. Shortly after its promulgation, the 1983 rule
was criticized for its unfair administration. Although many said its
application discriminated against particular groups of lawyers or parties,
others urged that its sanctions procedures were deficient. The 1983 rule was
also deemed too expensive by some who viewed the resulting financial costs
in satellite litigation as exceeding any benefits. Further, some expressed
concern about the "incremental injury to the civility of litigation that results
from lawyers impugning one another's motives and professionalism, and
seeking to impose burdens directly on one another. '""S
The 1990 Call for Comments was followed by a series of proposed
amendments to Rule 11 beginning in August 1991. 6 These proposals
F. Supp. 975, 982-83 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395, 397 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
8. 1983 Amendments, supra note 1, at 198-99 (advisory committee note).
9. Id. at 197.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 199-200 (advisory committee note).
12. Id. at 200 (advisory committee note).
13. Id. at 197.
14. Committee on Rules of Prac. and Proc., Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Call for
Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules,
131 F.R.D. 335 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Call for Comments].
15. Id. at 346.
16. Committee on Rules of Prac. and Proc., Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Draft Amendments].
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resulted in the new rule that took effect on December 1, 1993.' 7 The 1993
17. The 1993 amendments and advisory committee notes to Rule 11 appear in
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 Amendments]. The new rule is as follows:
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Representations to Court;
Sanctions
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by
at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not
represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the
signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.
An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected
promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney
or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under circumstances,-
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the
conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms,
or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in
Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21
days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or
denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court
may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and
attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent
exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for
violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.
(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an
order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b)
and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not
violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
1993]
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rule continues to provoke some controversy, though most critics of the 1983
rule prefer the change.
The 1993 rule "is intended to remedy problems that have arisen in the
interpretation and application of the 1983 revision of the rule."'" For
example, under the 1983 rule, the Supreme Court imposed a restriction that
a court may impose sanctions only against the signing attorney but not
against the attorney's law firm, even when the attorney signs on behalf of
the firm. 9 The new rule now allows trial courts to sanction the law firms
of attorneys who present frivolous papers.20 In addition, violations of the
rule no longer automatically trigger a sanction; rather, sanctions are left to
the "significant discretion" of the trial court.2 ' The new rule also seeks "to
equalize the burden of the rule upon plaintiffs and defendants."22  It
promotes deterrence rather than compensation as a primary goal, so that
(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this
rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in
subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of
a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the
movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred
as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for
a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless
the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or
settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose
attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the
sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not
apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are
subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
Id. at 419-24.
18. Id. at 583 (advisory committee note).
19. Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126-27 (1989).
State laws modeled after the 1983 federal rule have been read differently. See, e.g.,
Brubakken v. Morrison, 608 N.E.2d 471, 476 (I11. Ct. App. 1992) (holding the law firm and
attorney jointly and severally liable for sanctions imposed against the attorney).
20. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 580-82 (Rule 1 I(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B));
id. at 588-89 (advisory committee note).
21. Id. at 587 (advisory committee note).
22. Id. at 586 (advisory committee note). For example, the new rule adds that
"denials of factual contentions" must be warranted by the evidence or "reasonably based on
a lack of information or belief." Id. at 580 (Rule 1 l(b)(4)).
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monetary sanctions "should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty. 23
Generally, the 1993 rule "places greater constraints on the imposition of
sanctions,"24 particularly by affording many who are subject to possible
sanction an opportunity to take corrective action during the so-called safe
harbor." While the 1993 rule does somewhat broaden the range of those
ultimately responsible for frivolous papers" and the types of frivolous
papers covered,27 overall the number of hearings on Rule 11 violations
should decrease.
The new rule contemplates different sanctions for violations than were
appropriate under either the 1938 or 1983 rule. The 1938 rule mentioned
only "disciplinary action" and the 1983 rule allowed only "appropriate"
sanctions, exemplified solely by an award of litigation expenses, including
attorney's fees. 28  The 1993 rule expressly recognizes as appropriate
sanctions "directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into
court, or... an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the
reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of
the violation."29 Directives of a nonmonetary nature include court orders
"striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure;
requiring participation in ... educational programs; ... and referring the
matter to disciplinary authorities (or, in the case of government attorneys,
to [a superior]). '3  When a monetary sanction is imposed under the 1993
rule, "it should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty, ' 31 as the purpose
always "is to deter rather than to compensate."32 Awards of attorney's fees
23. Id. at 587-88 (advisory committee note). Rule 11(c)(2) provides that each
sanction must "be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated." Id. at 582.
24. Id. at 584 (advisory committee note).
25. Id. at 581 (Rule 1 l(c)(1)(A) provides a safe harbor period within which frivolous
papers may be withdrawn or corrected so as to avoid motions for ianctions.).
26. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing law firm responsibilities).
27. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 579 (1993 rule covers papers signed, filed,
submitted, or later advocated, and 1983 rule covers papers signed.).
28. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
29. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 582 (Rule 1 1(c)(2)).
30. Id. at 587 (advisory committee note).
31. Id. at 588 (advisory committee note).
32. Id. at 587 (advisory committee note). No explanation is given as to why fines
payable to the court are more effective deterrents of Rule 11 misconduct than awards of
attorney's fees. Perhaps the federal rule-makers found that the lure of attorney's fees caused
excessive Rule I I motions due to economic self-interest, and that federal judges could be
trusted to detect and objectively sanction significant Rule 11 misconduct even though the
injured party might not help when monetary incentives are removed. The federal rule-makers
distinguished discovery abuse from Rule II misconduct and continued to permit a broader
opportunity for the recovery of attorney's fees for harm resulting from discovery misconduct.
Id. at 627, 684-85, 687 (Rules 26(g)(3), 37(a)(4), and 37(c)(1)).
1993]
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under the 1993 rule are appropriate only when other sanctions provide
"ineffective" deterrence, 33 most typically when the violations involve
papers presented for improper purposes,34 "such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
35
The 1993 rule should reduce the number of motions seeking Rule 11
sanctions. It should also prompt more court-initiated inquiries into so-called
public interest sanctions against lawyers.36 Such sanctions are encouraged
under the new rule, and include fines, reprimands, required professional
training, and disciplinary referrals. Public interest sanctions provide a
vehicle for judges to address the misconduct of lawyers when no adverse
party complains. These sanctions are quite different from private interest
sanctions, such as an award of litigation expenses or the striking of a
frivolous paper, which are typically ordered at the urging of an injured
adverse party.
One of the more significant forms of public interest sanctions is a
disciplinary referral, involving a federal judge's referral of an errant lawyer
to a disciplinary authority. While such referrals were occasionally made
under the 1983 rule,3 7 and perhaps under its predecessor,38 their express
recognition in the legislative history accompanying the 1993 rule should
trigger at least a small cottage industry involving referrals in the coming
33. Id. at 588 (advisory committee note) (indicating the need for "unusual
circumstances" to merit the award of attorney's fees).
34. Id. (advisory committee note) (indicating unusual circumstances particularly likely
for Rule 1 I(b)(1) violations).
35. Id. at 580 (Rule 1 l(b)(l)). Some federal courts approached attorney's fee awards
under the 1983 rule in much the same way. See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Day, 148 F.R.D. 160,
186-87 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that the most effective deterrent to the filing of frivolous
claims is awarding the amount of expenses incurred during frivolous litigation to the
defendant).
36. For a discussion of public and private interest sanctions under the 1983 rule, see
Jeffrey A. Parness, The New Method of Regulating Lawyers: Public and Private Interest
Sanctions During Civil Litigation for Attorney Misconduct, 47 LA. L. REv. 1305 (1987).
37. The 1983 rule authorized federal judges to impose an "appropriate sanction" upon
rule violators, see supra note 2 and accompanying text, and such a sanction occasionally was
a disciplinary referral to a state disciplinary authority, see, e.g., Keener v. Department of
Army, 136 F.R.D. 140 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), or to the local trial court's own disciplinary
mechanism, see, e.g., Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990)
(explaining when referrals to an internal disciplinary mechanism are required by local court
rules).
38. The 1938 rule authorized federal judges to subject "wilful" violators to
"appropriate disciplinary action." See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text; see also
AAA v. Rothman, 101 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.N.Y. 195 1), order granted, 104 F. Supp. 655-56
(E.D.N.Y. 1952) (name of attorney found guilty of misconduct under 1938 rule was indexed
in the court clerk's office for easy reference in case of additional inquiries into future
misconduct).
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years. Such referrals will compete for consideration with other forms of
public interest sanctions recognized under the new rule.
Under the 1993 rule, disciplinary referrals may be ordered for many
forms of Rule 11 violations, including situations in which the misconduct
is corrected soon after notice of concern is given by either an adverse party
(via the notice preceding any motion) or by the judge (via a show cause
order). While the safe harbor within which frivolous papers may be
corrected or withdrawn can be used by attorneys to avoid or lessen fee
awards,-and while corrective action within the safe harbor can mitigate the
otherwise harsher public interest sanctions that might follow, correction or
withdrawal of Rule 11 violations will not absolutely protect attorneys against
all sanctions for conduct preceding a notice of concern.
Further, because attorney's fees may only be awarded when all other
sanctions provide "ineffective" deterrence and after time has been allotted
for the correction of the misconduct, outside disciplinary referrals and other
public interest sanctions will likely come after a court has taken initiative,
not after a party's motion, because the judge, rather than an adverse party,
is more interested in addressing the public concern with rule violations.
Such initiatives may be difficult at times, however, as private parties have
little incentive to inform the court about Rule 11 misconduct, especially if
it has been corrected. Thus, trial judges may have difficulty learning about
some of the very rule violations they might wish to sanction in the public
interest.
The procedural mechanisms and substantive criteria for disciplinary
referrals and other public interest sanctions should vary dramatically from
the guidelines for attorney's fee awards, the most prevalent sanctions under
the 1983 rule. While both disciplinary referrals and fee awards are forms
of sanctions that can address similar litigation misconduct, their purposes are
typically quite different. Disciplinary referrals, as with other public interest
sanctions such as fines payable to the court, are most often intended to
address the harm caused to the public at large; fee awards, like other private
interest sanctions, are usually intended to address chiefly the harm caused
to particular individuals or entities. Thus, disciplinary referrals are usually
considered at the urging of a public representative, and fee awards are
typically requested by the individuals or entities harmed. In considering
harm to the public caused by civil litigation misconduct, the public
representative is typically most interested in protecting scarce governmental
resources, general deterrence, and quasi-criminal punishment. The same
misconduct causes a private party to focus on compensation for personal
loss, specific deterrence, and perhaps punitive damages (possibly constituting
a windfall). Disciplinary referrals for civil litigation misconduct are
frequently considered by judges on their own initiative upon evidence of
especially egregious behavior, thus placing these judges in the uncomfort-
able position of performing both prosecutorial and judicial functions. These
judges may also need to undertake legislative functions (when the guidelines
are unclear) and to serve as witnesses (when the misconduct occurred in
1993]
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their presence or when the reasonable person standard applies). With fee
awards, judges can remain more disinterested.
Finally, the public interest sanctions available under the new Rule 11
may be either disciplinary or nondisciplinary in nature and need not involve
outside disciplinary agencies to be characterized as disciplinary. The
relevant distinctions are difficult to discern. Surely, an admonition,
reprimand, or censure of an attorney for professional misconduct during
litigation seems like a disciplinary action. But is the action disciplinary if
it involves a violation of a code of professional conduct governing all
attorneys admitted to practice in a given jurisdiction; of a code of civil
procedure governing all attorneys practicing before a particular court; or, of
a court order involving certain persons and entities involved in a single case
before a judge? May professional discipline be imposed only by a body
whose exclusive jurisdiction involves errant professionals? The public
interest sanction of a frivolous litigant paying a fine to the court does not
inevitably appear to be disciplinary in nature. When an attorney pays such
a fine, often discipline is not involved because compensating the court for
lost resources may be the primary motivation and the fine might not be
based on a violation of the professional conduct rules governing only
lawyers. Distinctions between disciplinary and nondisciplinary public
interest sanctions against lawyers aside, the limits of a court's professional
disciplinary responsibility need to be carefully considered so that undue
interference with traditional bar disciplinary bodies can be avoided.
B. The Intent Behind the Push for More Disciplinary
Referrals in the 1990s
What prompted the federal rule-makers to encourage more disciplinary
referrals and to move away from fee awards? The rule-makers seemed
chiefly concerned with channeling attention away from compensation and
toward deterrence, assuring fair application of Rule 11, reducing satellite
litigation by allowing many violations later corrected to go unsanctioned,
and adding greater judicial discretion to sanctioning. Fee awards are now
reserved for the most serious violations, and federal judges are trusted to
find the best ways to deter future litigation misconduct. The 1993 rule-
makers did reject the urging of many to return Rule 11 to its pre-1983 form
so that only willful violations were addressed and only disciplinary actions
were available as sanctions; trial judges thus retain the power to inquire into
unintentional bad acts and to remedy such acts through either disciplinary
or nondisciplinary actions.
While the goals of the 1993 rule are somewhat clear, the particular ways
in which disciplinary referrals and other disciplinary actions and sanctions
will serve these goals are not so clear. Surely, the newly recognized rule
authority of district judges to issue "show cause" orders on their own
initiative invites greater consideration of all public interest sanctions. The
1993 rule-makers did refer to the Manual for Complex Litigation when
[Vol. 61:37
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discussing "the variety of possible sanctions,"" and the Manual includes
within the recognized "types of sanctions" a referral "to the bar associa-
tion."40 The Manual does not say much about when outside referrals are
most appropriate, but does include within its list of available sanctions the
removal of an attorney from a pending case, the temporary suspension of an
attorney from practice before the court, and disbarment. Thus, disciplinary
referrals to the trial court's own attorney regulatory mechanism, and
discipline undertaken solely by the trial judge (what might be called
vigilante discipline), seemingly would also be appropriate forms of
disciplinary sanctions under the Manual and under the 1993 rule. The
Manual goes on to say that in imposing any sanction, a court should
consider "the nature of the sanctionable conduct, its consequences on others,
and the purposes to be served by a sanction."41
In addition to these varying forms of disciplinary authority over
misconducting attorneys, the 1993 rule-makers suggested that other persons
having some relationship to the errant lawyer might also be employed in
helping to deter future misconduct. Thus, when government attorneys
present frivolous papers, the rule-makers contemplated that referrals might
be made "to the Attorney General, Inspector General, or agency head."42
With attorneys employed in private practice, the rule-makers encouraged
using the law firms, partners, or associates of the errant lawyers for
educational or rehabilitative purposes.43 The 1993 rule now expressly
permits vicarious Rule 1 1 liability, that is, sanctions against attorneys or law
firms who have not themselves presented frivolous papers but who are
nevertheless "responsible" for them." A law firm that imposes "substantial
restrictions on the discretion of individual attorneys employed by it" can
now be held responsible when those restrictions result in a violation;45 in
certain circumstances, the individual attorney making the improper
presentation may not even be sanctioned. 6 Because law firm responsibility
for its agents' misconduct is to follow "established principles of agency"
under the new rule,47 Rule 11 sanctions will now more frequently include
orders that law firms "institute internal approval procedures to assure that
future filings" comply with the certification standard.48
39. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 587 (advisory committee note).
40. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 42.3 (2d ed. 1985).
41. Id.
42. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 587 (advisory committee note).
43. Education and rehabilitation have been recognized as proper goals under the 1983
rule. See, e.g., Harmony Drilling Co. v. Kreutter, 846 F.2d 17, 20 (5th Cir. 1988).
44. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 581 (Rule 11 (c)).
45. Id. at 589 (advisory committee note).
46. Id. (advisory committee note).
47. Id. (advisory committee note).
48. Comment of the Chicago Bar Association to the Committee on Rules of Practice
1993]
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
The 1993 rule-makers provide little guidance, however, on how district
judges should approach outside disciplinary referrals (beyond the trial court)
and on how they should coordinate such referrals with other forms of
discipline and with nondisciplinary sanctions. In encouraging outside
referrals and other public interest sanctions, the federal rule-makers did
consider the responses to their 1990 Call for Comments.4 9 Only a few of
the responses, however, spoke significantly of outside disciplinary referrals
and other public interest sanctions.50  Few, if any, of the responses
mentioned the Manual for Complex Litigation, the relevant procedural or
substantive guidelines, or the relationship between the varying forms of
appropriate sanctions.
One of the more extensive responses to the 1990 Call for Comments
was issued in November 1990 by the Committee on Federal Courts of the
New York City Bar Association.5 That Association's proposal sought to
establish Rule 11 as the "single sanctions rule relating to the permissible
conduct of counsel and litigants. 52  Specifically, it sought to define an
''appropriate sanction" for litigation misconduct as
a fine, a reprimand, censure, referril to disciplinary authorities, mandatory
continuing legal education, an order precluding the introduction of certain
evidence, an order precluding the litigation of certain issues, an order
precluding the litigation of certain claims and defenses, entry of default
judgment, dismissal of the action, injunctive relief limiting the offender's
future access to the courts, an order to pay to injured persons financial
compensation such as expenses and counsel fees reasonably incurred
because of the abusive conduct or any other sanction the court, in its
discretion, finds appropriate. 3
Standards guiding choice of sanction, unfortunately, were absent.
In the fall of 1990, the Chicago Council of Lawyers responded to the
1990 Call for Comments by urging that new forms of sanctions be expressly
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States 12 (Nov. 2, 1990) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Comment of the Chicago Bar Association]. Such procedures have
occasionally been ordered under the 1993 rule. See, e.g., Nault's Auto Sales, Inc. v.
American Honda Motor Co., 148 F.R.D. 25, 37-38 (D.N.H. 1993) (holding that all future
filings by plaintiff shall be reviewed by a "Rule 11 committee" of at least two experienced
partners at plaintiffs law firm who are "not directly involved" in the case).
49. See 1990 Call for Comments, supra note 14, at 335.
50. With the much appreciated assistance of the federal rule-makers' staff, the author
reviewed all written correspondence relevant to the 1990 Call for Comments on May 13,
1993 in Washington D.C.
51. See Committee on Fed. Cts., Comments on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure II
and Related Rules, 46 REC. OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 267 (1991).
52. Id. at 296. Regarding attorney conduct, the association urged a "subjective bad
faith" standard that did not necessarily require an inquiry into "an attorney's subjective state
of mind." Id. at 296-97.
53. Id. at 300-01.
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recognized under Rule 11.54 Specifically, the Council sought an amend-
ment to "make clear that a nonmonetary sanction is a legitimate form of
sanction under the Rule." 55  The Council urged that Rule 11 should
expressly recognize a reprimand as appropriate. 6 In support, the Council
noted that the explicit recognition of attorney's fees in the 1983 rule tended
to remove "the judge's traditional and necessary discretion in case
management, and fall especially heavily on pro-se [sic] and indigent litigants
and the attorneys who volunteer to represent them on a pro-bono [sic] or
reduced-fee basis. '57 The 1983 rule was also said to inhibit judges from
taking "mitigating and exculpating circumstances into account" when
imposing sanctions. 8
In the fall of 1990, the Chicago Bar Association also answered the call
by urging that "greater consideration be given to non-monetary sanc-
tions. '" 5  Its proposal contemplated that no attorney's fees be awarded
unless other sanctions were "insufficient to deter future violations and that
the amount of the sanction is the least severe sufficient to deter future
violations."'6 Besides attorney's fees, the sanctions noted by the Associa-
tion included continuing legal education; the use of unpublished, rather than
published, opinions; and orders that law firms "institute internal approval
procedures to assure that future filings comply with the rule."61 Sanctions
under the rule would be based on the deterrence of frivolous litigation.62
Like the Chicago associations, the National Bar Association asked
federal rule-makers in the fall of 1990 to direct more attention to nonmone-
tary sanctions.63 On behalf of a membership heavily involved in federal
civil rights litigation,' the Association suggested that federal judges be
"encouraged to utilize innovative approaches as a preferred deterrence to
54. Letter from the Chicago Council of Lawyers to the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Nov. 1, 1990) (on
file with author).
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id. The Council recommended, "The words ';or a non-monetary sanction, such
as the striking of the pleading, motion, or other paper, or a reprimand' should be added after
the phrase 'including a reasonable attorney's fee."' Id.
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id.
59. Comment of the Chicago Bar Association, supra note 48, at 12.
60. Id. at 2 (citing language contained in part (c) of the Association's proposed
amendments to Rule 11).
61. Id. at 12.
62. Id. at 11 ("The Association believes that the primary purpose of Rule 11 should
be to deter frivolous litigation, rather than to compensate the aggrieved party.").
63. Rule 11 and Civil Rights Lawyers: Comments of National Bar Association in
Response to the Call for Comments Issued by the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules
(Nov. 1, 1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rule 11 and Civil Rights Lawyers].
64. Id. at 1.
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monetary sanctions in light of the dearth of attorneys who choose to practice
civil rights law and the unprofitability of practicing civil rights law."65
Possible approaches could include private and public reprimands; referrals
to state disciplinary bodies; attorney license suspensions; required legal
education; and the circulation of a copy of the sanction order involving an
attorney within his or her law firm, a remedy deemed "educational and
rehabilitative in nature."66
Also in the fall of 1990, Professor John Leubsdorf urged federal rule-
makers "to replace the present discretionary sanctioning provisions [of Rule
11] with a requirement of fixed but relatively small lawyer fines. 67 This
change would move the sanctioning scheme toward deterrence and away
from compensation and "provide protection against sanctions that are
unfairly large. ' 8 He added, "To make it easy to know whether a lawyer
had been penalized under the rule before and to make penalty information
available to disciplinary authorities and the public, courts imposing rule 11
sanctions would be required to report them to a national rule 11 registry.
69
Finally, in the fall of 1990, Professor Victor H. Kramer of the Universi-
ty of Minnesota Law School urged federal rule-makers to rewrite Rule 11
so that it would serve as "an instrument to improve professional responsibili-
ty," and thus become "primarily a lawyer discipline device. 70  He
advocated that each federal "district should adopt a local rule to provide that
every violation of Rule 11 by a lawyer be reported to the disciplinary
authority in the state in which the offending lawyer both has been authorized
to practice law and has his own principal office. ' 71  Yet, presumably
because he believed these state authorities had not fully enforced profession-
al conduct standards, 72 he suggested the new rule should expressly
65. Id. at 12.
66. Id. at 14-15.
67. Letter from John Leubsdorf, Visiting Professor at Columbia University School
of Law, to Professor Paul Carrington 1 (Nov. 16, 1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Letter from Leubsdorf].
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id. at 1.
70. Letter from Professor Victor H. Kramer, Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota, to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States 4 (Oct. 23, 1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Kramer].
Professor Kramer also said that judges should think of the amended rule "as a tool to make
more professionally responsible lawyers litigating in the federal courts." Id. at 3.
71. Id.
72. Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 As a Tool to Improve Piofessional
Responsibility, 75 MINN. L. REv. 793, 797-98 (1991). Kramer writes:
For many years, state rules have made it unethical for lawyers to file suits or take
other action in litigation that is legally insupportable or designed to harass the
opposing side. The state lawyer-disciplinary bodies, however, have failed to
enforce these provisions. Rule 11 thus offers the federal courts an opportunity to
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recognize fines payable to the court as a civil penalty7 3 and should
encourage judges to "take pains to name" lawyers found to have violated the
rule.74
The 1993 rule should prompt fewer motions seeking attorney's fees and
more court initiatives regarding alleged attorney misconduct. Although the
result should be a greater number of referrals to outside disciplinary
authorities, the process and criteria for these referrals remain unclear. When
outside referrals were ordered under the 1938 and 1983 rules, the results
were often unfair. The same has been true of outside referrals under other
procedural laws. This history further challenges the judges responsible for
outside disciplinary referrals under the 1993 rule. Case by case approaches
seem inevitable, with local court rules an option-especially in the larger
trial courts where an absence of such guidelines could lead to unfortunate
and avoidable disparities.
Part III of this Article will review earlier experience with outside
disciplinary referrals. Part IV will offer some suggestions on the use of
disciplinary actions under the 1993 rule. The relationships between outside
disciplinary referrals and other public interest sanctions-which may include
other opportunities for discipline-will also be explored in Part IV.
III. DISCIPLINARY REFERRALS OF FEDERAL
CIVIL LITIGATION MISCONDUCT TO DATE
While the 1993 rule expressly invites more outside bar disciplinary
referrals, such referrals occasionally occurred under the earlier versions of
Rule 11 and under other procedural laws. Further, such referrals have long
been authorized, if not mandated, by state professional conduct standards for
judges and lawyers. First, these standards will be reviewed. Next,
experience under the earlier versions of Rule 11 and under other procedural
laws will be assessed. In making these assessments, the varying recipients
of disciplinary referrals by federal trial judges will be recognized. These
recipients include not only outside bar disciplinary agencies under state
authority, but also the federal courts' own internal disciplinary mechanisms.
Recipients of referrals occasionally have been nondisciplinary entities, such
as the employers of the misconducting lawyers, who certainly have differing
interests than do state or federal licensing agencies. Referrals to disciplinary
enforce professional responsibility rules that state disciplinary bodies have been
unable or unwilling to enforce.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
73. Letter from Kramer, supra note 70, at 5-6 (stating that fines would "deter
unprofessional conduct [as well as] compensate the courts for ... causing them to engage
in needless expense arising from frivolous litigation").
74. Id. at 3.
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and nondisciplinary entities, of course, do not preclude the referring judges
from also imposing their own public or private interest sanctions.
A. State Professional Conduct Rules and
State Disciplinary Referrals
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct of the American Bar Association,
on which many state judicial codes are based, requires a judge to inform the
appropriate disciplinary authority whenever there is knowledge that a lawyer
has violated the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in a manner "that
raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness."75  The Model Code of Judicial Conduct defines "appropriate
authority" as an authority with the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings
with respect to the violation reported.76 Further, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct indicate that lawyers having knowledge of serious rule
violations by other lawyers should report them to the appropriate profession-
al authority." Serious professional misconduct seemingly includes many
forms of civil litigation misconduct.7" The Model Rules do not define
what is meant by "appropriate professional authority," but the accompanying
commentary indicates that reports should usually be sent to bar disciplinary
agencies.79
Because such reporting requirements have been in place for awhile,
questions arise about their use under earlier versions of Rule 11. To address
these questions, inquiries were sent in the falls of 1992 and 1993 to state bar
75. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D)(2) (1990).
76. Id. (terminology section).
77. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1992) ("A lawyer having
knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.").
For a history and analysis of the rule, as well as one explanation of why it is not enforced,
see Gerard E. Lynch, The Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491. For a recommendation
on a "more realistic" rule, which contains a more limited but rigorous standard, see id. at
539, 547 ("I would, however, tentatively suggest three categories [of Rule 11 violations]:
professional misconduct involving dishonesty toward a client or the legal process; serious
criminal conduct involving dishonesty ... ; and incompetence clearly amounting to
malpractice.").
78. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) cmt.
79. Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules is somewhat analogous to the Model Code; thus, the
reporting requirements of both the Model Code and the Model Rules would seem to require
judges and lawyers to report violations of Rule 11 to bar disciplinary committees. For
discussion and suggestions on reporting by lawyers, see Committee on Prof. Resp., The
Attorney's Duties to Report the Misconduct of Other Attorneys and to Report Fraud on a
Tribunal, 47 REC. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 905 (1992) [hereinafter
Attorney's Duties].
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disciplinary personnel nationwide requesting information on their experience
with reports of Rule 1 1 violations by federal district judges.8" Specifically,
the letter requested information on the number of Rule 11 violations referred
and the possible res judicata effects in state disciplinary proceedings of
earlier federal court rulings. The letter also requested information on the
procedures to monitor lawyer misconduct in the federal courts, as well as
comparisons of state and federal judicial referrals.
Of the sixty-eight letters mailed, covering over fifty American jurisdic-
tions, forty-eight responses were received. These responses generally
indicated that few, if any, Rule 11 violations had been reported and thus few
res judicata questions were entertained.8' Yet, an Indiana official noted
that while reporting from federal offices generally was haphazard, formal
referrals from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
had recently increased.82 Many of the respondents reported having no
official system for monitoring attorney misconduct during federal civil
litigation; some respondents indicated that they followed newspaper articles
and the like as best they could. 3
Despite the general lack of referrals, a few state disciplinary personnel
commented further. A Wisconsin official noted that federal judges had
referred a few serious matters to its Professional Responsibility Board,
although not all referrals related to Rule 1 1 violations. 84 The official noted
the difference between finding a Rule 11 violation and a state ethics law
violation is that the latter involved subjective standards. Other disciplinary
officials discussed possible res judicata implications. A North Carolina
official reported that a federal court finding of a Rule 11 violation would not
by itself mean that there was a violation of the state's rules.85 A Utah
80. A copy of the letter mailed in the fall of 1992 appears in the Appendix. This
letter was followed by a second request delivered about a year later to those failing to
respond to the first. The descriptions of the responses that follow in the text do not
differentiate between responses received in 1992 or 1993.
81. Although many of the respondents indicated that they did not keep official
statistics on the origin of referrals, a large number commented from personal experience.
Further, the impression among most disciplinary personnel was that state court judges were
more likely to report violations than were federal judges. However, neither state nor federal
court referrals triggered much of the typical agency's work.
82. Letter from the Disciplinary Commission of the Indiana Supreme Court to Jeffrey
A. Parness (July 22, 1993) (on file with author).
83. These responses were similar to those received from state disciplinary officers
surveyed as part of a recent study in the Federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals. STEPHEN
B. BURBANK, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, STUDIES OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM: RULE 11 IN
TRANSITION, THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 11, at 89 (1989).
84. Letter from the Wisconsin Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility to
Jeffrey A. Parness (June 12, 1992) (on file with author).
85. Letter from the North Carolina State Bar to Jeffrey A. Parness (May 18, 1992)
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official noted that issue preclusion would not apply because the standard of
proof in a disciplinary action was clear and convincing evidence, while in
a Rule 11 case it was a preponderance of the evidence.16  Finally, an
Oregon official noted that while a finding of a Rule 11 violation would not
necessarily be binding in a state disciplinary proceeding, it would be given
great weight in determining whether to initiate a disciplinary action.87
B. Disciplinary Referrals Under the Old Rule II
As noted, the 1938 version of Federal Civil Rule 11 covered only willful
violations, which when found, might subject an attorney only "to appropriate
disciplinary action." By comparison, the 1983 version contemplated both
willful and nonwillful violations, which when found, would trigger "an
appropriate sanction," exemplified only by an order requiring the reimburse-
ment of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees. Assuming
comparable willful violations, both the 1938 and 1983 versions of Rule 11
seemingly allowed a disciplinary referral as a form of appropriate sanction,
and the 1983 rule may have allowed referrals even for certain nonwillful
conduct. Yet neither rule mandated, encouraged, nor generated many
referrals.88 In the last few years, however, the 1983 rule, together with
comparable rules in such areas as appellate practice, has prompted a slowly
growing number of federal court referrals to state disciplinarians, which
were apparently unnoticed by some of the survey respondents.
Little dialogue on the preclusive effects of Rule 11 findings, and even
less talk of the complexities raised by the mixture of federal and state
interests, has accompanied the slow rise in federal court referrals to state
disciplinarians. 9 There has also been little discussion of Rule 11 referrals
to federal disciplinary authorities, though district judges often have relevant
disciplinary mechanisms established by their own courts' local rules. Little
(on file with author).
86. Letter from the Utah State Bar to Jeffrey A. Parness (July 17, 1992) (on file with
author).
87. Letter from the Oregon State Bar to Jeffrey A. Parness (May 26, 1992) (on file
with author). For a general discussion of issue preclusion when civil proceedings precede
disciplinary actions, see Lester Brickman & John M. Bibona, Collateral Estoppel as a Basis
for Attorney Discipline: The Next Step, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1991).
88. See, e.g., THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUD. CTR., THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING
PROCESS 127-28 (1988) (review of Rule 11 case law reveals "sporadic" use of alternatives
to awards of litigation expenses, with "primary" alternatives being warnings and fines
payable to the court); Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J.
1313, 1333 (1986) (noting that in the first two years under the 1983 rule, a survey of
opinions showed 96% of sanctions involved awards of litigation expenses).
89. See, e.g., BURBANK, supra note 83, at 89-90, 100 (stating that "the use made of
Rule 11 sanctions by bar discipline groups ... warrant[s] further study").
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analysis has been made of vigilante discipline, which occurs when federal
judges act on their own under Rule 11 to order such traditional disciplinary
remedies as reprimands, censures, temporary suspensions, apologies,
mandated education, and counselling.9" Nor have the relationships between
all forms of discipline and other sanctions been analyzed. 9' Typically,
under the 1983 rule, referrals to disciplinary agencies and vigilante
discipline have occurred during rulings on a private party's motion for
attorney's fees; referrals are not often requested by the movants and the
possibility is usually not even raised by the court prior to its ruling. 92
Absent referrals of lawyer misconduct under the 1983 rule, the relevant
disciplinary agency rarely becomes aware of even egregious lawyer
misconduct. No evidence suggests that other lawyers, their clients, or the
represented parties of the errant lawyers reported serious Rule 11 miscon-
duct to state or federal disciplinary agencies, even after it was conclusively
found by a federal court after a Rule I 1 hearing. Additionally, there is little
evidence that state disciplinary agencies have systematically tracked the
growing numbers of Rule 11 violators. The reporting provisions of state
judicial and professional standards rules have drawn scant attention from
those interested in the sanctions explosion under the 1983 rule.
C. Disciplinary Referrals Under Other Laws
In the last decade, increasing numbers of disciplinary referrals have been
made under other federal laws that, like Rule 11, address civil litigation
misconduct. On occasion, Rule 11 is used in conjunction with one or more
of these laws. This experience is comparable to the referrals undertaken
solely under the 1983 rule.
One federal provision employed to refer attorneys to disciplinary
authorities is Rule 46(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
dealing with misconduct before a circuit court of appeals. Other federal
90. But see Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990)
(distinguishing cases in which reprimands by individual judges may be warranted-such as
threats to the orderly administration of justice in the courtroom-from cases in which
referrals to the federal court's own disciplinary mechanism are required).
91. But see William I. Weston, Court-Ordered Sanctions of Attorneys: A Concept
That Duplicates the Role of Attorney Disciplinary Procedures, 94 DICK. L. REV. 897 (1990)
(utilization of court-ordered sanctions is bad because it undermines the role of attorney
discipline agencies).
92. See, e.g., Keener v. Department of Army, 136 F.R.D. 140 (M.D. Tenn. 1991)
(referral to state disciplinary board); Matthews v. Freedman, 128 F.R.D. 194 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(reprimand with order and opinion sent to state disciplinary board); Kenna v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 128 F.R.D. 172 (D.N.H. 1989) (similar referral to state conduct committee);
Lyle v. Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 392, 403-04 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (imposing
a reprimand and requiring its publication in a local legal newspaper advertisement to be paid
for by the reprimanded attorneys).
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support for bar disciplinary referrals is found in various local federal district
court rules. A final law is embodied in the concept of inherent court power
as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court.
1. Federal Appellate Procedure Rule 46(c)
Disciplinary referrals have long been recognized as "appropriate disci-
plinary action" under Rule 46(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. That rule provides:
A court of appeals may, after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show
cause to the contrary, and after hearing, if requested, take any appropriate
disciplinary action against any attorney who practices before it for conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar or for failure to comply with these rules
or any rule of the court.93
One appellate court employed the rule to refer an attorney, who had been
admonished in an earlier case to follow court rules and orders,9 4 to
"appropriate state disciplinary authorities." 95 In doing so, the court noted
that "state bar officials have great responsibilities in this area and have a
right to expect our cooperation," while observing that these state officials
"are in a far better position to assess the overall professional performance
of the attorney."96
2. Local Federal Court Rule
Disciplinary referrals for civil litigation misconduct have also been made
pursuant to local district court rules. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
where the federal trial court's rules of professional conduct are the rules
adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,97 a local rule provides that
a federal judge shall refer "misconduct or allegations of misconduct which
93. FED. R. APP. P. 46(c). Sanctions for frivolous appeals (which may extend beyond
"disciplinary action") can be also based on other laws, including 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988)
(attorney liability for excess costs, expenses, and fees arising from unreasonable and
vexatious multiplication of proceedings); FED. R. APP. P. 38 ("damages and single or double
costs" possible for appellee when appeal is deemed frivolous); FED. R. App. P. 46(b)
(suspension or disbarment for "conduct unbecoming a member of the bar"); a circuit court
rule; the court's inherent authority; or some combination of these. A plea for a single rule
covering all appellate court misconduct by lawyers is found in Robert J. Martineau, Frivolous
Appeals: The Uncertain Federal Response, 1984 DUKE L.J. 845.
94. United States v. Dominguez, 810 F.2d 128, 129 n.* (7th Cir. 1987).
95. Id. at 129 (attorney had been ordered to file a jurisdictional memorandum or a
motion for extension of time and failed to do so).
96. Id. Similar is United States v. Stillwell, 810 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1987). In both
cases, fines payable to the court were also levied upon the attorney.
97. U.S. DIST. CT. E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. IV(B).
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... would warrant discipline ... to counsel for investigation" and the
possible prosecution of a formal disciplinary proceeding.9" Thereafter, the
rule discusses possible results of a counsel's investigation.99 Although an
investigation at the federal level is clearly contemplated, this rule has also
been employed to justify a referral solely to the Disciplinary Board of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. '°° The rule exists alongside another local
rule that reserves to individual judges "such powers as are necessary for the
court to maintain control over proceedings conducted before it,""' which
seemingly includes certain disciplinary powers (such as the power to
reprimand).
The Pennsylvania rule is unclear on the distinctions between the varying
forms of disciplinary proceedings. Further, the rule is quite different from
other local federal rules. Thus, trial attorneys who practice before several
federal trial courts frequently confront divergent local regulations on
disciplinary referrals and other discipline.'0 2  As contrasted with the
Pennsylvania rule, a local Utah court rule provides that show cause orders
involving possible disciplinary action are issued only upon evidence of
discipline elsewhere, a conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude, or "a repeated lack of competence to practice."'0 3  The rule
recognizes that the traditional contempt powers remain unimpaired.'" A
second Utah rule reserves to individual judges the power to impose
98. Id. at V(A).
99. Id. at V(B).
100. See Greenfield v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 146 F.R.D. 118, 129 (E.D. Pa.
1993).
101. U.S. DIST. CT. E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. XII.
102. For a review of differing local rules, see Burton C. Agata, Admissions and
Discipline of Attorneys in Federal District Courts: A Study and Proposed Rules, 3 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 249, 282-83 (1975). In 1973, the United States Judicial Conference approved for
transmittal to Congress a draft bill that would have regularized disciplinary procedures in all
federal courts by permitting a court to request the F.B.I. to investigate charges that a member
of the bar was subject to disciplinary action and by authorizing the Attorney General to
prosecute a formal disciplinary proceeding at a court's request. JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S.,
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 43-44
(Apr. 5-6, 1973) [hereinafter REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS]. A study of all federal district court
local rules authorized by the United States Judicial Conference found in 1988 that of 94
district courts, 93 had admission to the bar rules, and 90 had attorney discipline rules; but
the study proceeded no further as its researchers were "instructed to refrain from a further
analysis of these subjects." SECTION ON HIST. & METHODOLOGY, JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE
U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PRACTICE 1, 9, app.
A (1988).
103. U.S. DIST. CT. UTAH R. OF PRACTICE 103-5(d).
104. Id. at 103-5(h).
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sanctions for violations of local rules, which may include assessments of
costs, attorney's fees, or fines.05
In the Eastern District of North Carolina, the rules of disciplinary
procedure were previously quite like the Pennsylvania rules. Yet, in North
Carolina, referrals to internal federal mechanisms were read by a federal
appeals court to be mandatory under the local rules, even when only a
reprimand was suggested; the imposition of a sua sponte disciplinary penalty
by the trial judge was read as permitted only when an attorney's conduct
threatened the orderly administration of justice in the courtroom.'0 6 Since
the appeals court decision, the local rules have been amended so that
referrals are made discretionary,0 7 and a new rule was added recognizing
that referrals should not interfere with or supplant "the inherent authority of
the court to discipline lawyers licensed to practice" before the court.'08
3. Inherent Court Power
Disciplinary referrals, as well as other forms of disciplinary action, for
civil litigation misconduct may also be undertaken pursuant to inherent court
power, "governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested
in courts to manage their own affairs."' 0 9  Disciplinary action by trial
judges may be deemed appropriate "in order to prevent undue delays in the
disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the
District Courts,""' and may be especially helpful in addressing bad faith,
vexatious, wanton, or oppressive attorney conduct."' The power to
control admission to the bar and to discipline attorneys has long been
viewed as within "the scope of inherent power of the federal courts.""' 2
IV. DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS UNDER THE NEW RULE 11
In inviting increasing disciplinary referrals and other disciplinary actions,
the 1993 rule-makers provided some guidance on procedural and substantive
standards. The 1993 rule expressly mandates that "notice and a reasonable
opportunity to respond"' 3 be given prior to the imposition of any sanc-
tion. Seemingly, disciplinary referrals can be ordered upon notice of, and
an opportunity to respond to, a court-initiated inquiry, and perhaps after a
105. Id. at 104.
106. Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 550 (4th Cir. 1990).
107. U.S. DIST. CT. E.D.N.C. D.R. 104.02 (as amended on Feb. 5, 1992).
108. Id. at 113 (as amended on Feb. 5, 1992).
109. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962).
110. Id. at 629-30.
111. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975).
112. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2132 (1991).
113. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 580 (Rule 11 (c)).
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hearing on a private party's motion for attorney's fees or some other private
interest sanction. 14 Further, the 1993 rule says that any sanction order
must be accompanied by a description of the conduct constituting the
violation, as well as an explanation of "the basis for the sanction imposed,"
whether requested or not.15
The rule-makers further indicated a preference for public interest
sanctions such as disciplinary referrals. A party may only be awarded
attorney's fees when necessary for effective deterrence of the "conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated""' 6 and after the safe
harbor period has passed. Thus, motions for Rule 11 fee awards should
typically be contemplated only when the movants have some good reason
to believe that the misconduct will not be corrected or withdrawn during the
safe harbor, and when the trial court finds that a fee award constitutes the
only effective means to achieve deterrence. Movants for fees will likely
urge that their opponents presented papers for improper purposes, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. 17  With the expected drop in Rule 11 motions, disciplinary
referrals, like other public interest sanctions under the 1993 rule, should
increasingly be dependent upon court initiatives.
With court initiatives the norm, how will federal trial judges distinguish
between the disciplinary agencies to which referrals might be made? What
forms of misconduct should trigger any such referrals, and what additional
process should be employed? Finally, when might vigilante discipline, or
other forms of Rule 11 public interest sanctions (such as fines), be
considered as alternatives, or additions, to disciplinary referrals?
A. Guiding Principles on Disciplinary Referrals
and Vigilante Discipline
Disciplinary referrals should be guided by the principles that serious
professional misconduct by attorneys during federal civil litigation is best
left to traditional state disciplinary agencies, and that less serious misconduct
is best handled by the trial judge presiding in the relevant civil case. The
distinction between serious and less serious misconduct is difficult to draw,
yet should normally be based on the reporting duties for judges and lawyers
in the state in which the misconduct occurred."' As noted earlier, the
114. Cf Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 632-33 (1962) (dismissal of complaint
for failure to prosecute can occur without notice of possibility of dismissal and without
adversary hearing as long as party knew generally of possible consequences of his conduct).
115. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 583 (Rule 11(c)(3)).
116. Id. at 582 (Rule I I(c)(2)).
117. Id. at 588 (advisory committee note).
118. The judge and lawyers in a federal civil case most often are all members of the
bar of the state in which the case is pending; when such is not the case, perhaps some other
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distinction drawn in the American Bar Association's model codes involves
conduct violative of professional norms "that raises a substantial question as
to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness."" 9 Violations raising
such substantial questions are better left to state agencies, as federal courts
typically defer to state authority on the standards for competent legal
practice. 20  The internal disciplinary bodies of federal district courts,
where they do exist,' simply do not have the expertise and experience,
and perhaps resources, of traditional state agencies.
122
By contrast, less serious Rule 11 violations are best left to the presiding
trial judge. These lesser violations often require such public interest
sanctions as a reprimand or a fine payable to the court in order to promote
general deterrence. The private interest sanction of a fee award no longer
adequately serves to deter such violations, because corrections of violations
made within the safe harbor can negate the possibility of any such
award. 123 Violations that are corrected within the safe harbor nevertheless
involve rule violations that may need to be deterred and which can trigger
a public interest sanction other than a disciplinary referral in order to
promote such deterrence. 24 Referral of less serious violations to a federal
state's reporting duties should be observed.
119. E.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D)(2) (1990); see supra notes
75-77 and accompanying text. For an elaboration on what constitutes serious misconduct
warranting a report, see Attorney's Duties, supra note 79, at 911-14, wherein the authors
conclude that lawyers now have no "clear indication of when they must make a report," id.
at 927. The intent behind the changes to the A.B.A. Judicial Code was, however, "to
diminish the number of instances in which judges take it on themselves to impose sanctions
for professional misconduct without such reporting." LISA MILORD, A.B.A. CTR. FOR PROF.
REsP., THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE A.B.A. JUDICIAL CODE 25 (1992).
120. This deference continues today although the interstate uniformity of state
professional conduct norms has diminished since the adoption of the A.B.A. Model Rules,
creating an increasing disuniformity among local federal courts. Stephen B. Burbank, State
Ethical Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969, 972 (1992).
121. For a review of the types of disciplinary mechanisms employed by federal district
courts, see Agata, supra note 102, at 282-83; see also REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note
102, at 43 (noting that while most district courts defer to state bar grievance committees and
procedures, some use U.S. Attorneys and others appoint special committees of the bar-
which normally lack adequate funding or personnel to make proper inquiry).
122. For recommendations on the establishment of a uniform set of federal standards
for professional conduct and disciplinary enforcement, see Agata, supra note 102, at 284-85,
and Proposed Model Federal Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, 103 REP. OF A.B.A. 330-36
(1978).
123. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 581 (Rule I l(c)(1)(A) disallows any motion
for sanctions to be presented if the challenged paper was withdrawn or corrected during the
safe harbor period.).
124. Specifically, the 1993 rule allows court initiatives on all rule violations, id. at 582
(Rule I l(c)(1)(B)), whether or not corrected during the safe harbor period, and only disallows
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court's own disciplinary body would be both expensive and inefficient. On
this matter, the previously described North Carolina experience is compel-
ling testimony. 125 Less serious violations should be met by federal judges
with sanctions such as reprimands and fines.
Public interest sanctions, such as reprimands and fines, which deter
frivolous paper presentments in the federal trial courts, have been rightly
entrusted to the "significant discretion" of district judges.'26 Judges are
often exposed firsthand to the consequences of frivolous papers and are in
a good position to determine responsibility. Many federal judges have
gained much experience in hearing motions for fee awards under the 1983
rule. The timely imposition of public interest sanctions by the judge
exposed to the violation and its effects serves to assure that delay does not
deny the justice to which the public is entitled. Referrals of the more
serious violations to traditional disciplinary agencies serve to ensure that
proper deference is accorded state power'27 and that satellite litigation is
reduced.
The 1993 rule allows court initiatives and public interest sanctions on
all rule violations, whether corrected during the safe harbor or not, and only
disallows monetary sanctions (as fines payable to the court) if voluntary
dismissal or settlement has occurred. Thus, the 1993 rule permits nonmone-
tary sanctions (as disciplinary referrals or reprimands) against attorneys who
have corrected or withdrawn their frivolous papers. 28 Thus, even when
frivolous papers are removed during the safe harbor period, their present-
ment by lawyers should be reported to state disciplinary agencies when
substantial questions are raised about the lawyers' honesty, trustworthiness,
or fitness. The presentment of frivolous papers by lawyers might also
trigger other public interest sanctions when such questions are not raised but
when other sanctions are necessary for deterrence.
B. Referrals to Employers
Another public interest sanction contemplated by the 1993 rule-makers
that could serve as a deterrent is a referral of an attorney's frivolous present-
court initiatives regarding monetary sanctions if voluntary dismissal or settlement has
occurred, id. at 583 (Rule 11(c)(2)(B)), thus seemingly permitting nonmonetary sanctions
(such as reprimands) against attorneys who have corrected their frivolous papers.
125. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
126. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 587 (advisory committee note).
127. Unlike less serious misconduct, which may lead to fines or reprimands and which
is explored openly during civil proceedings, more serious misconduct, which may lead to
more serious sanctions, is usually handled by disciplinary agencies privately at the outset.
Thus, alleged violators are protected early on against harm caused by allegations of serious
misconduct that are later determined to be without foundation.
128. See supra note 124.
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ment to the attorney's employer. The rule-makers expressly indicated that
in addition to disciplinary referrals, "in the case of government attorneys"
referrals might be made "to the Attorney General, Inspector General, or
agency head." '29  The rule-makers also contemplated that a private
employer, such as a law firm, could be asked to look at any of its attorneys'
presentments that have been questioned by opposing counsel. If an attorney
whose paper has been questioned does not offer corrections, and is thereafter
found to have violated Rule 11 and to be liable for fees or other litigation
expenses, the law firm will "ordinarily be viewed as jointly responsible
under established principles of agency."'' 3' This all suggests that referrals
of private attorneys to their employers may be appropriate after a violation
has been found.
What purposes might be served by such referrals? Certainly, lawyers
will be more careful if they know that their missteps will be reported to
their bosses; thus, deterrence will be promoted. Additionally, reports of a
lawyer's violation should cause at least some employers to look anew at
their own policies regarding their employees' paper presentments, which also
promotes deterrence. This form of deterrence was occasionally attempted
under the 1983 rule. For example, one district judge required that his
opinion finding a Rule 11 violation be circulated to members of the
offending lawyer's firm.13' But can a Rule 11 referral to an employer also
encompass a trial judge's inquiry and possible dictates about the employer's
and thus its attorneys' manner of preparing papers for presentment to a
federal court?
Given the rule-makers' recognition of governmental employer referrals
and of law firm responsibility for fees, trial court inquiries into institutional
practices on paper presentments should be deemed available under the 1993
rule. The rule-makers expressly recognized that an employer's practices can
so restrict an attorney that the attorney, "in unusual circumstances," may not
be held personally responsible for presenting a frivolous paper. 32 Recall
the Chicago Bar Association's suggestion that Rule 11 sanctions include
orders that law firms "institute internal approval procedures to assure that
future filings comply with the rule."' 13  Such orders have already appeared
under the 1983 rule. In one case, a trial court ordered that "all future
pleadings submitted by or on behalf' of a party "be reviewed by a 'Rule 11
129. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 587 (advisory committee note).
130. Id. at 589 (advisory committee note); see also id. at 581 (Rule 1 1(c)(1)(A)).
131. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 129 (N.D. Cal.
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
132. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 589 (advisory committee note).
133. Comment of the Chicago Bar Association, supra note 48, at 11; see supra note
61 and accompanying text.
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committee' of not fewer than two experienced litigation partners at the firm"
employed by the party.""
C. The Relationships Between Disciplinary Referrals, Reprimands,
and Other Rule 11 Public Interest Sanctions
Referrals to disciplinary agencies, referrals to employers, and trial court
reprimands are only a few of the public interest sanctions available to the
"significant discretion" of district court judges. As noted, other sanctions
include "an order to pay a penalty into court"' 35 and an order "requiring
participation in seminars or other educational programs. '"136 The 1993
rule-makers contemplated that penalties paid into court, or fines, would
emerge as one of the most significant sanctions under the new rule, and
would be the new rule's chief monetary sanction (replacing attorney's fee
awards). 37  When, if ever, should fines be preferred to referrals or
reprimands, and vice versa?
The rule-makers did not address these questions, and further chose not
to enumerate all of the "factors a court should consider in deciding ... what
sanctions would be appropriate in the circumstances."' 38 They did find the
following questions to constitute "proper considerations" ' when federal
judges choose sanctions:
Whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; whether it was
part of a pattern of activity, or an isolated event; whether it infected the
entire pleading, or only one particular count or defense; whether the person
has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation; whether it was intended
to injure; what effect it had on the litigation process in time or expense;
whether the responsible person is trained in the law; what amount, given
the financial resources of the responsible person, is needed to deter that
person from repetition in the same case; what amount is needed to deter
similar activity by other litigants . .. ."'
Given the breadth of discretion, generalizations are difficult. Yet, when
the newly added prospect of law firm (or other institutional) responsibility
for Rule 1 1 violations is considered, some guidelines on public interest
sanctions emerge. Because deterrence is now the driving force in the choice
134. Nault's Auto. Sales, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 148 F.R.D. 25, 37
(D.N.H. 1993).
135. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 582 (Rule 11(c)(2)).
136. Id. at 587 (advisory committee note).
137. Id. at 587-88 (advisory committee note) ("Since the purpose of Rule I I sanctions
is to deter rather than to compensate, the rule provides that, if a monetary sanction is
imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty.").
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of sanctions against lawyers, and is to be "limited to what is sufficient to
deter repetition" of the errant lawyers' misconduct or "comparable conduct
by others similarly situated,"'' misconduct by attorneys who work in
major law firms (or other significant institutions) could trigger very different
sanctions than comparable misconduct by solo practitioners. In the latter
instance, assessments of fines against lawyers who actually pay them could
appear more frequently, as could orders requiring participation in seminars
or other educational programs. In the former, reprimands of individual
lawyers might be accompanied by fines actually paid by the lawyers'
employers and, when appropriate, orders regarding required "educational and
rehabilitative" '42 efforts to be made by the employing institutions.
While less serious Rule 11 misconduct might prompt differing
approaches to choosing public interest sanctions for institutional and
noninstitutional lawyers, more serious professional misconduct should be
handled similarly for all lawyers. In the latter situation, state disciplinary
agencies should be contacted when Rule 11 hearings lead to concerns about
lawyers' "honesty, trustworthiness or fitness." 143 Because these disciplin-
ary agencies typically do not consider law firms' (or other legal institutions')
practices or histories" as distinct from the acts of their individual law-
yers, district judges should be able to exercise authority over legal
institutions engaged, or possibly engaged, in serious professional misconduct
under Rule 11. This is so especially when such conduct extends far beyond
their individual lawyers' acts and thus implicates institutional policy,
custom, or routine. The 1993 rule-makers alluded to such institutional
culpability, and to court power over it, when they noted that judges could
inquire into "governmental agencies or other institutional parties that
frequently impose substantial restrictions on the discretion of individual
attorneys employed by it," and that "in unusual circumstances," sanctions
might be imposed on the institutions and not on individual lawyers.
1 45
D. Process and Disciplinary Referrals
Is it silly to consider the process required for disciplinary referrals under
the 1993 rule, since codes of judicial and lawyer conduct either require or
allow referrals of perceived attorney misconduct involving frivolous paper
presentations? It is generally understood that referrals under the codes are
authorized regardless of any rule of procedure on frivolous papers and can
141. Id. at 582 (Rule 1 (c)(2)).
142. Rule 11 and Civil Rights Lawyers, supra note 63, at 14-15.
143. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D)(2) (1990).
144. But see Edward A. Adams, Discipline Rules Should Cover Firms, 15 NAT'L L.J.,
July 5, 1993 at 10 (reporting on a proposal of the Bar of the City of New York to extend
attorney discipline rules to law firms).
145. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 589 (advisory committee note).
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occur without notice to those whose questionable conduct is reported.146
Nevertheless, a disciplinary referral under the 1993 rule is described by the
rule-makers as one of "a variety of possible sanctions."' 47 Any sanction
under the rule may be imposed only "after notice and a reasonable
opportunity to respond;"'48 must be "limited to what is sufficient to deter
repetition" of the violation by the culprit and "others similarly situated;"'4 9
and should be accompanied by a description of "the conduct determined to
constitute a violation" and an explanation of "the basis for the sanction
imposed."'15  Further, because motions for sanctions under the new rule
will be quite limited, and because a private party's motion for attorney's
fees or the striking of a frivolous paper will not usually include a request
that the trial judge undertake a disciplinary referral, all disciplinary referrals
under the new rule should be preceded by a court "initiative." The initiative
should include "an order describing the specific conduct that appears to
violate" Rule 11 and direct the alleged culprit "to show cause" why the rule
has not been violated.'
5 1
This show cause order should also provide guidance on the standards
and processes applicable at the show cause hearing, including whether and
how oral or written testimony will be entertained, 152 whether discovery
will be allowed prior to the hearing, whether other public interest sanctions
might also be considered, and whether some special public representative (or
an amicus) will participate as quasi-prosecutor at the hearing. 15 The court
should articulate the applicable burden of proof at the hearing. If only a
referral (based upon the existence of a "substantial question as to the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness") is contemplated, then the court
146. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D)(2) cmt. 1 (1990); see also
supra note 75 and accompanying text.
147. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 587 (advisory committee note).
148. Id. at 580 (Rule 11(c)).
149. Id. at 582 (Rule 1 1(c)(2)).
150. Id. at 583 (Rule 11(c)(3)).
151. Id. at 582 (Rule ll(c)(1)(B)).
152. Id. at 589 (advisory committee note) (stating that the availability of the chance
for written submissions, oral arguments, or evidentiary presentations "will depend on the
circumstances").
153. See, e.g., Snow Machines, Inc., v. Hedco, Inc., 838 F.2d 718, 726 n.6 (3d Cir.
1988) (noting possibility of appointing an amicus when fines payable to the court are
considered); see also Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 809
n.21 (1987) (under its supervisory power, court determines a criminal contemnor has a right
to a disinterested prosecutor, but the prosecutor can not be the civil litigant whose injunction
was allegedly disobeyed). While special prosecutors may be employed, it is usually
unnecessary for differing judges to oversee the show cause hearing and the trial on the
merits. Supreme Court of Ohio, Op. 89-32 (Oct. 13, 1989) ("A judge's filing of a
disciplinary complaint against a lawyer does not, by itself, disqualify the judge from hearing
any cases involving that lawyer.").
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will need to indicate whether it will look for a demonstration that some
evidence suggesting a referral is needed, whether probable cause exists to
believe a "substantial question" exists, or whether some other defined
standard will be employed.'54 If more than a disciplinary referral is
contemplated, then the court should indicate what other sanctions are being
contemplated and that factual issues will be resolved on a preponderance of
the evidence standard. 15
In making referrals, district judges must clearly differentiate between
such probable cause and factual findings based upon a preponderance of the
evidence. The latter will be needed if referrals are accompanied by other
public interest sanctions such as fines or reprimands.'56 The latter will
also prompt the type of issue preclusion questions discussed earlier
involving disciplinary agency proceedings that follow Rule 1 1 determi-
nations.'57 The differentiations are also important if national, state, or
local registries of Rule 11 violators are ever established.'
V. CONCLUSION
The new Federal Civil Rule 11 will redirect district judges from private
party motions and attorney's fee awards to court initiatives and disciplinary
referrals. Yet the new rule is unclear on the standards and procedures for
these referrals and on the relationships between these referrals and other
154. One report suggested the standard that the reporter have knowledge of a lawyer's
conduct that the reporter "believes clearly to be in violation of Disciplinary Rules."
Attorney's Duties, supra note 79, at 910.
155. But see Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1559 n.10 (11 th Cir. 1987) (severe
Rule 11 sanctions require "extensive due process safeguards"); see also Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745 (1982) (discussing when the "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard may
be unconstitutional).
156. 1993 Amendments, supra note 17, at 583 (Rule 11(c)(3) requires that "the
conduct determined to constitute a violation" be described.); see id. at 589 (advisory
committee note) (required description can be waived).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
158. See Letter from Leubsdorf, supra note 67, at I (Professor Leubsdorf's call for a
"national rule 11 registry"); see also REP. OF THE COMM. ON THE EVALUATION OF
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, A.B.A. CTR. FOR PROF. RESP., LAWYER REGULATION FOR A
NEW CENTURY 84-85 (1992) (recommendations for improving National Discipline Data Bank
maintained by the A.B.A.); Agata, supra note 102, at 286-87 (discussing necessity of
coordinating information on lawyers who have been disciplined). To date, federal courts
have shown little concern with eliciting information on those members in its practicing bar
that have been subjected to Rule 11 sanctions imposed by another court. See, e.g., U.S.
DIST. CT. N.D. ILL. LOCAL GENERAL R. 3.51 (Any attorney admitted to practice in the
district must inform the court's clerk upon being subjected to "public discipline" by any other
federal court or by a state court, which includes "censure, suspension, and disbarment, but
not sanctions or contempt.").
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public interest sanctions. Further, state disciplinary bodies have had little
experience to date with federal court referrals. Thus, the new rule presents
significant challenges to those overseeing federal civil litigation. This
Article offers assistance to those applying the new Rule 11 by setting forth
some guiding principles on disciplinary referrals, vigilante discipline, and
other sanctions under the new rule. Further, it demonstrates that district
judges may now look more to the employers of attorneys who err under the
rule in order to help deter future litigation misconduct.
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Appendix
To Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel:
I am writing to learn about the relationship between lawyers' litigation
misconduct in federal courts and your state's scheme for disciplining
lawyers (disbarment, reprimand, etc.). My interest is driven by my view
that this relationship is important but seldom studied, and my perception that
since the adoption in 1983 of amendments to Federal Civil Procedure Rule
11, there have been continuing increases in referrals of federal civil litigation
misconduct to state disciplinary authorities. Given the recent proposals of
the U.S. Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Civil Rules for
changing Rule 11 (wherein the Committee Notes for the first time mention
the possible sanction of referral to state disciplinary authorities), referrals
should continue to increase.
In particular, I welcome information on the numbers and forms of such
referrals in your jurisdiction (have there been more since 1983, are referrals
increasing, etc.); on the manner in which such referrals are processed; and
on the (res judicata) effects of earlier federal court decisions about
misconduct (under Rule 11, inherent power, etc.) on later, related state
disciplinary proceedings. As well, I am curious about whether your office
on its own monitors federal actions involving lawyer misconduct, and which
federal officers (district, appellate, magistrate, or bankruptcy judges) have
been most and least involved in referrals. Finally, I want to learn about
similar referrals of litigation misconduct made by judges within your state,
as well as referrals from state courts outside your state (how do they
compare to federal referrals).
I know a simple response is impossible and that you may not even be
able to answer all my questions. I hope you devote some time to my
requests, and copy this letter for others in your state who can also help me.
Your aid will help me study this important area of lawyer discipline.
I prefer written responses. But please call (815-753-0340) with any
questions. Thanks for your prompt attention.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey A. Parness
Professor of Law
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